This essay examines three competing views of technological change, developed at the beginning of the millennium, and their impact on our lives. The discussion will lead to three conclusions. First, we must be involved in decisions about how technology is regulated and used. Second, we should be wary not to consider all technologies as having the same effects. The cell phone is neither the personal computer nor the television, and there is no reason to consider each as having the same (...) potential social consequences. Third, new methodologies must be developed to account for any changes in social relations that come about as a result of our adoption of these technologies. In the final section of the essay, the consequences of contemporary technologies on what it means to be human are briefly discussed. Rather than substitute technology for democracy or big data for the ability to find significant information, we must take democratic control of these technologies and affirm our humanity. Indeed, I argue along with noted commentators on technology that what makes us human is our ability to sort and find relevant information, reflect on our actions and take risks in associating with other humans. These are things that we must always bear in mind if we are to flourish in the information age. (shrink)

Fascism should more properly be called corporatism because it is the merger of state and corporate power.—Benito Mussolini. The whole [school] system should be blown up … I feel like a prophet toda...

There is no epistemic fault in interpreting events in ways that improve our behavior and lifestyle in situations that force interpretation. Fictionalized but possibly true narratives endow adult life with meaning, in turn rendering day-to-day affairs more agreeable. In this essay, I call the practice of introducing stories when a situation forces interpretation to affect behavior or lifestyle faux-believing, and I explicate and defend faux-believing against the objection that it is epistemically blameworthy After giving two examples of ' (...) class='Hi'>faux belief,' and distinguishing it from similar concepts, including belief proper, I ask if we can have the right to faux-believe independent of whether the faux belief is justified. Next, I turn to William James's "The Will to Believe" to argue that if James is correct that we have the right to believe, then we also have the right to faux-believe. While explicating James's argument for when we have the right to believe on insufficient evidence, I highlight two separate theses of James's (often erroneously thought to be a single thesis). It is one of these two theses that implies we also have the right to faux-believe. (shrink)

I consider a puzzle that greatly preoccupies some people and mildly preoccupies others, while being of no interest to some at all: “How did those people get into an elite university?” Problems with writing faux Japanese fiction provide one explanation. Once skilled literary craftspeople have failed, one turns to others.

Scholarly debate over faux-snuff’s content has predominantly focused on realism and affect. This paper seeks to offer an alternative interpretation, examining what faux-snuff’s form reveals about self. Faux-snuff is typically presented from a first-person perspective (killer-cam), and as such is foundationally invested in the killer’s experiences as they record their murder spree. First then, I propose that the simulated-snuff form reifies self-experience in numerous ways. Faux-snuff’s characteristic formal attributes capture the self’s limited, fractured qualities, for example. (...) Second, I contend that the faux-snuff film’s singular focus lays bare the killer-self. The killer’s identity is principally constituted by the murders they commit. Resultantly, faux-snuff’s victims necessarily affirm the killer qua killer in the moment of murder. However, homicide eradicates the victim. Victims thus vanish in the moment they become the killer’s counter-identity. Consequently, the mock-snuff film centralises not only killing, but also the killer’s self-abnegation. Simulated-snuff’s repeated murders are a compulsive process of becoming in which the killer-self is both reified and erased. Despite presenting events through the killer’s eyes then, the simulated-snuff film can never provide access to the killer. The killer is an absent-presence that also acts as a constant reminder that the viewer is profoundly distanced from the action depicted, despite its apparent immediacy. In sum, faux-snuff commonly combines first-person form with relentless violent content. That melding leads me to scrutinize the apparently absolute binary oppositions at the heart of self-conception. By nature of their approach, these films routinely expose the tipping points between victim/killer, self/other, and life/death. In doing so, simulated-snuff catalyses questions about the self in general, and about our own selves in particular,. (shrink)

Scholarly debate over faux-snuff’s content has predominantly focused on realism and affect. This paper seeks to offer an alternative interpretation, examining what faux-snuff’s form reveals about self. Faux-snuff is typically presented from a first-person perspective (killer-cam), and as such is foundationally invested in the killer’s experiences as they record their murder spree. First then, I propose that the simulated-snuff form reifies self-experience in numerous ways. Faux-snuff’s characteristic formal attributes capture the self’s limited, fractured qualities, for example. (...) Second, I contend that the faux-snuff film’s singular focus lays bare the killer-self. The killer’s identity is principally constituted by the murders they commit. Resultantly, faux-snuff’s victims necessarily affirm the killer qua killer in the moment of murder. However, homicide eradicates the victim. Victims thus vanish in the moment they become the killer’s counter-identity. Consequently, the mock-snuff film centralises not only killing, but also the killer’s self-abnegation. Simulated-snuff’s repeated murders are a compulsive process of becoming in which the killer-self is both reified and erased. Despite presenting events through the killer’s eyes then, the simulated-snuff film can never provide access to the killer. The killer is an absent-presence that also acts as a constant reminder that the viewer is profoundly distanced from the action depicted, despite its apparent immediacy. In sum, faux-snuff commonly combines first-person form with relentless violent content. That melding leads me to scrutinize the apparently absolute binary oppositions at the heart of self-conception. By nature of their approach, these films routinely expose the tipping points between victim/killer, self/other, and life/death. In doing so, simulated-snuff catalyses questions about the self in general, and about our own selves in particular,. (shrink)

Moral debate over vegetarianism forms the backdrop to a preliminary consideration of the questions: Is it ethical to produce, sell and eat faux meat? Is it ethical to produce, sell and wear fake animal skin? Is it ethical to sell or wear secondhand or thriftshop genuine animal skin? If vegetarianism is morally required, the question of just what uses of nonhuman animals are ethical or unethical and on what grounds is always on tap. In this piece, I examine the (...) above questions in light of deontological then utilitarian reasons for vegetarianism. I conclude deontological or animal rights grounds entail the moral condemnation of faux meat and fake and secondhand animal skin. I conclude utilitarian or animal welfare grounds entail, with some qualification, the moral acceptability of faux meat and fake animal skin but the clear moral unacceptability of secondhand animal skin. (shrink)

Louis Painchaud | : Pendant près de deux millénaires, « faux-Judéens » et « synagogue de Satan » de Smyrne et de Philadelphie ont été considérés comme des « Juifs », membres des « synagogues » de ces villes, hostiles aux « chrétiens » qu’ils auraient même dénoncés auprès des autorités. Dans la deuxième moitié du xxe siècle, dans un contexte qui a suscité tout un courant de réflexion critique sur l’antisémitisme chrétien, plusieurs ont proposé de voir dans ces (...) « Juifs » des factions hostiles à Jean au sein des assemblées auxquelles il s’adresse. L’hypothèse qui est proposée ici est de voir, dans ces Judéens accusés de blasphème et taxés d’être de faux Judéens ou des Judéens menteurs, des membres de l’ethnos Judéens souillés, aux yeux de Jean, un prophète judéen sectaire, par leur intégration dans le tissu associatif de la cité. Quant à la « congrégation de Satan » qu’ils formeraient, elle ne doit pas être entendue comme la désignation d’une communauté judéenne ayant une existence réelle dans la cité, mais comme une pure construction de Jean, prophète de Jésus le Vivant qui ne se savait pas encore chrétien, visant à démoniser non pas tous les Judéens de ces deux cités, mais certains Judéens infidèles aux commandements et, donc, à leur identité judéenne. | : For nearly two thousand years, the Smyrneans and Philadelphians that the book of Revelation describes as “false Judeans” and as making up a “synagogue of Satan” have been taken to be “Jews,” members of the “synagogues” located in those cities, who were hostile to local “Christians,” to the point of denouncing them to the authorities. In the second half of the twentieth century, in a context in which Christian anti-Semitism was increasingly recognized and critiqued, many argued that these “Jews” were in fact members of the communities addressed by John, belonging to factions hostile to his message. In this paper, I will argue that the people whom John accuses of being blaspheming and false Judeans were members of the Judean ethnos who were seen by John — himself a Judean sectarian — as having become defiled through their integration into the social and professional fabric of the city. From this point of view, the “synagogue of Satan” is not to be seen as a real Judean community, but rather as the pure creation of John, a prophet of Jesus the Living One who did not know that later generations would consider him a “Christian.” Thus John does not intend to demonize all the Judeans in these two cities ; rather, his invective is directed at some Judeans, whom he sees as betraying the commandments and, hence, their own Jewish identity. (shrink)

At the head of The Colbert Report, one of the most popular shows on television, Stephen Colbert is a pop culture phenomenon. More than one million people backed his fake candidacy in the 2008 U.S. presidential election on Facebook, a testament to the particularly rich set of issues and emotions Colbert brings to mind. Stephen Colbert and Philosophy is crammed with thoughtful and amusing chapters, each written by a philosopher and all focused on Colbert's inimitable reality — from his word (...) creations (truthiness, wikiality, freem, and others) to his position as a faux-pundit who openly mocks Fox News and CNN. Although most of the discussion is centered around The Colbert Report, this collection does not neglect either his best-selling book, I Am America (And So Can You!), or his public performances, including his incendiary 2006 White House Press Correspondents' Dinner speech. (shrink)

D'un philosophe comme de l'autre, on peut dire qu'ils sont tous deux, dans l'horizon contemporain, des penseurs de l'amour. Tous deux s'inscrivent en faux contre la réduction de ce dernier à la sexualité, mais, tout autant, contre sa réduction inverse, plus ancienne, à une forme de mystique éthérée de type platonico-chrétien qui a pu se formuler sous le terme d'agapè. Nous nous proposons dans cette contribution d'étudier la pensée de J.-L. Marion en adoptant l'hypothèse d'une « unité théo-phénoménologique » (...) de son questionnement. Nous faisons usage du terme « théo-phénoménologie » en référence à l'approche de l'œuvre du philosophe et théologien grec Christos Yannaras, et souhaitons ce faisant rendre justice à l'avancée de J.-L. Marion en situant son geste philosophique singulier à la lumière de la théologie orthodoxe du Christianisme grec oriental telle qu'elle est elle-même renouvelée philosophiquement par C. Yannaras. Jean-Luc Marion and Christos Yannaras are both well-known as contemporary love-thinkers. Both refuse the reduction of love to sexuality as much as its older opposite reduction to a form of platonic christian mystics sometimes named agapè. In the following contribution I wish to examine Jean-Luc Marion's approach while making the hypothesis of its « theo-phenomenological » unity. Since the expression « theo-phenomenology » is used in reference to the work of the contemporary Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras, I aim at doing justice to Marion's philosophical thrust by putting his conception of love in the light of the Orthodox theology of the Eastern Church as it is nowadays philosophically renewed by Yannaras. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage rassemble une serie d'articles parus en francais dans les Archives de philosophic entre 1974 et 1987. Passons rapidement sur le fait que la collection «Vrin-Reprise» se donne pour but de remettre a la disposition de tous des textes ou des etudes «aujourd'hui introuvables ou inaccessibles». Ouvert par un texte de 1981 ou I'auteur nous livre son autobiographic intellectuelle, l'ouvrage reprend ensuite l'article «Philosophie de la recherche scientifique» (1974) qui expose les vues de Radnitzky sur une theorie praxiologique de (...) la recherche. Reconstruction ratjonnelle de la recherche scientifique comme systeme d'action, cette theorie developpe des modeles de facteurs qui brientent la-recherche ainsi que des modeles de coagence des recherches theoriques et empiriques. Bien que la theorie se concentre sur les processus de production, elle comprend egalement un systeme de types de criteres qui permettent de juger les produits de la recherche scientifique. Con§ue comme voie mediane par rapport aux reconstructions logiques et aux etudes empiriques de la science, la praxiologie envisagee par Radnitzky («"Praxiologie" est employe ici au sens de Kotarbinski; en gros, c'est la theorie de Faction effective et efficace» [p. 99]) se reclame d'une theorie de l'action dirigee rationnellement vers un but (Zweckrationalitat) qui deboucherait ultimement sur une «anthropologie philosophique de la connaissance» (p. 31). Quoi qu'il en soit, Radnitzky manifeste le desir de se situer a la confluence des traditions analytique et hermeneutique; mais, en fait, malgre un apanage de concepts systemiques qui lui est particulier, son entreprise demeure largement tributaire de la theorie critique de Popper, comme l'atteste la teneur des autres articles qui composent cet ouvrage et qui portent tous, a une exception pres, sur la methodologie popperienne des sciences. L'exception est un article recent qui propose d'emprunter a l'economie l'analyse cout-benefice pour tirer au clair les questions de choix intertheorique («preference rationnelle») en science. Pour le reste, Radnitzky nous presente une defense parfois servile de la methodologie popperienne, tout en tentant de l'affermir par sa propre contribution d'une dimension qui lui manque, la dimension praxiologique justement. (shrink)

Il problema della rappresentazione, connaturato ad ogni mediazione linguistica del rapporto di mente e mondo, è nelle sue molteplici forme un tema antico della riflessione filosofica. La rappresentazione letteraria appartiene alla stessa categoria e pone problemi analoghi al pensiero. Che cosa significa rappresentare poeticamente? Il concetto di finzione letteraria può avere solo un senso peggiorativo o limitante nei confronti della comunicazione dell’universale, o ne può essere una modalità? Il tema del saggio è il rapporto tra realtà e finzione letteraria che (...) pare emergere da I falsari di André Gide. Seguendo le intuizioni e i suggerimenti dello scrittore, si proverà a tracciare le linee principali di un’interpretazione positiva della finzione letteraria, che ne riconosca la potenza espressiva senza soffocarne i caratteri distintivi. Non è detto, poi, che ciò che vale per la rappresentazione poetica non possa avere un senso anche sotto punti di vista più generali. (shrink)

I argue that Schmitt was a faux jurist and that is important to understand ‘Schmittean’ logic. This is a logic which aims to undermine democracy and the rule of law which is not unique to Schmitt and is at play in our contemporary world.

In this article, I argue that atheism is different from secularism. Secularism is based on a faux elimination of theology which effectively preserves that theology in the guise of overcoming it. To achieve atheism (a term that I draw from the work of Maria Aristodemou), I argue that one needs to directly confront the theological element in order to come to terms with it. In this essay I look at how two political theological thinkers, Nietzsche and Benjamin, accomplish this. (...) Nie-tzsche accomplishes atheism via his thesis of the “death of God,” a death that is not always literal but which creates a space for human life that is not determined by theological terms. Benjamin does the same thing with his idea that God vacates divine powers of judgment and determination in order to allow an atheistic space where human beings can engage in their own self-determination (even as the notion of God remains to challenge any would be human spokespersons for that role). I ultimately argue that atheism and anarchism are related concepts based not just on a rejection of certain forms of theology and all forms of archism, but also in terms of the way they allow a posi-tive and undetermined human response. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the trolley method of moral philosophy has three shortcomings not yet adequately addressed in the literature. First, trolley problems highlight high stakes ethical decisions. These decisions do not represent the majority of ethical decisions made by most people, and thus, the trolley method ignores most of moral life. Second, the trolley method operates by way of a faux-anonymization of moral agents. This process leads to descriptions of moral agents being unwittingly supplied by those (...) to whom the problems are presented and thereby the formation of a paradigmatic moral agent which excludes a considerable number of real world moral persons. Lastly, the trolley method mischaracterizes what most moral decision-making is like by presenting a moral agent's decision as isolated, uninfluenced, and made with full self-awareness. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to expose, and provide a possible solution to, an internal inconsistency in Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition. Honneth requires a way of making his claim that misrecognition causes subjective suffering, with the potential to cognitively disclose injustice, consistent with his account of ideological recognition as a form of misrecognition that engenders compliance with an oppressive social order. Only by reconciling these claims—that is, by showing how ideological recognition can engender an acceptance of domination (...) whilst at the same time causing subjective suffering—can Honneth's theory of recognition retain the kind of critical capacities he desires. As a means of achieving this reconciliation, I propose the notion of “invisible suffering.” In the case of ideological recognition, I suggest that the suffering caused by misrecognition has its disclosive power blocked by the faux-affirmation that the ideology discursively accords, and this renders the experience of suffering, qua painful indicator of social injustice, invisible to the subject. Drawing on insights from medical sociology, I show how the need to supplement Honneth's theory of recognition with the idea of invisible suffering is revelatory of the kind of critical theoretical stance demanded by his ontological commitments. (shrink)

This article provides an empirical demonstration of the saliency of epistemics to two core conversational organizations, turn-taking and repair. To that end, I examine cases in which a participant of a multiparty conversation intervenes into a repair sequence to respond to a repair initiation addressed to the trouble-source speaker, that is, in violation of the turn-taking rules, without having an epistemically grounded entitlement to do so. I show that such interventions enact a range of corrective actions vis-a-vis the repair initiation, (...) such as contesting and correcting assumptions or understandings conveyed by the repair initiation. In providing these corrections ‘out of turn’, the intervening speakers demonstrate their own attentive recipiency or cultural expertise and, at the same time, expose the repair initiator’s interactional faux pas. The analysis demonstrates the procedural consequentiality of epistemic considerations for the interlocutors – and, thus, the necessity to incorporate them into an empirically grounded analysis of their actions. (shrink)

Ce livre traite du 11 septembre ; du triomphe de la télé réalité, des formes nouvelles de domination symbolique, du capitalisme culturel, mais il gravite autour d'un seul et même foyer : nous vivons une crise mondiale de narration, dont le symptôme le plus visible est une inflation narrative, la substitution de l'anecdote au récit. Qu'il emprunte la forme de l'essai ou du récit, ce livre décrit la situation d'un homme sans recours narratif face à l'expérience, qui ne sait plus (...) faire la distinction entre fait et fiction, et entre vrai et faux. Un homme qui représentait pour Hannah Arendt, "le sujet idéal du règne totalitaire". Un homme, en somme, sans récit. Face à l'empire, c'est le manque et l'impossibilité d'une contre-narration que Christian Salmon explore - et déplore - ici. i. (shrink)

There are many different kinds of libertarianism. The first is right libertarianism, which received its most powerful expression in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), a book that still sets the baseline for discussions of libertarianism today. The second, I will call faux libertarianism. For reasons I will explain in this paper, most ‘man-on-the-street’ libertarians and most politicians who claim to be libertarians are actually this kind of libertarian. And third, there is left libertarianism, which is what I (...) shall spend most of this paper explicating. But I will not simply be surveying the views of those who identify as left libertarians and put this forth as if I were engaged in an exegetical exercise. Instead, what I shall set forth is a kind of manifesto, a statement of why I consider myself a left libertarian, one that takes this approach to political morality well beyond where it was left around the end of the last century by the previous generation of left libertarians. My hope is to provide those who find certain left libertarian ideas attractive a guide by which they can explain and harmonise their own views, recognise left libertarianism as a distinct comprehensive political doctrine, and feel more open to identify themselves as left libertarian too. (shrink)

There is confusion about what counts as abstraction in photography: art theorists class very different kinds of photographs as abstract, and common philosophical views of photography, if true, should cause us to doubt their very possibility. I address two questions here: ‘What is Abstraction?’ and ‘What is Abstraction in Photography?’ To the answer the second, I briefly consider a third: ‘What is Photography?’ so that the resulting account is not undermined by a poor theory of photography. In answer to my (...) target question, I outline a schematic typology of kinds of work generically typed as ‘abstract’ in order to bring out some differences between them. I distinguish ‘proto’, ‘faux’, ‘constructed faux’, ‘weak’, ‘strong’, ‘constructed’ and ‘concrete’ abstraction, although the differences between them are not always clear-cut and there is room for debate about borderline cases. My goal is not to resolve all such cases, but to show: that there is a range of broadly identifiable kinds of abstraction in photography; that images can be abstract in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons; and why certain images are not abstract, despite being widely typed as such. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This article addresses two main concerns: first, the relation between the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria as applied to pleasure, and, second, the status of our pleasures of learning. In addressing the first, I argue that Plato keeps the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria distinct in his assessment of pleasures and thus leaves room for the possibility of hybrid pleasures in the form of true impure pleasures and false pure pleasures. In addressing the second issue, I show that Plato's view is (...) perfectly able to accommodate an understanding of our pleasures of learning as pure pleasures even if such pleasures are preceded by awareness of a lack (ignorance).RÉSUMÉ: Cet article aborde deux concepts principaux: premièrement, la relation entre les critères de vérité/fausseté et de pureté/impureté appliqués au plaisir, et deuxièmement, le statut de notre plaisir d'apprendre. En abordant le premier concept, j'argumente que Platon tient distincts les critères de vérité/fausseté et de'pureté Iimpureté dans son évaluation du plaisir, laissant ouverte la possibilité de plaisirs hybrides sous forme de vrais plaisirs impurs et faux plaisirs purs. En abordant le deuxième concept, je montre que le point de vue de Platon est parfaitement capable d'accommoder la compréhension de nos plaisirs d'apprendre comme plaisirs purs si de tels plaisirs sont précédés par la conscience d'un manque (ignorance). (shrink)

« Si la connaissance se donne comme connaissance de la vérité, c’est qu’elle produit la vérité par le jeu d’une falsification première et toujours reconduite qui pose la distinction du vrai et du faux. » Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1re éd. : 1971)."If knowledge is given as knowledge of the truth, it is because it produces the truth by the game of a first, primary falsification renewed again and again which raises the distinction of (...) true and false" [my translation]. Michel Foucault, Lessons on the will to know, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1st ed.: 1971)I wonder how can Foucault, who refers to Nietzsche as source of inspiration, speak of falsification and deny at the same time objectivity of truth – besides the obvious pun. The challenge of Nietzsche is to contest the objectivity of truth as human desiderata, in such a context Foucault's notion of falsification (of what? falsification of an objective reality?) does either make no sense at all or encodes some other meaning beyond being false – a possible reading would be to take it that Foucault means "distortion", or better “will to deceive “.Perhaps, Foucault's observation amounts to the simple remark that some of the so-called scientific justifications of institutionalized qualifications and anathemas that have important political and socio-economic consequences such as those involving notions as health, disease, or gender do not have the scientific backing they are purported to have (now scientific backing, I guess, must be understood in a rather standard or naïve sense of distinguishing between sciences and pseudo-sciences). This might in some sense be a sensible reflection, and it must be conceded that Foucault had the merit of undertaking extensive and thorough examinations of archives, protocols and reports buried in institutions of various kinds which animated his legendary charming style of writing. Of course, this is quite far away from constituting a revolutionary assault on the notions of (scientific) truth, knowledge and meaning, but, one can say, I think, that his work motivated and still motivates some new approaches to the study of institutional archives. If the reading proposed in the preceding paragraph seems a too meagre result and we are prepared to read Foucault's remarks as involving more thorny epistemological matters, there are of course other ways to delve into them: On one hand I allow me to suggest studying the sceptics of the ancient Greek tradition, or the study of analogical dialectical reasoning within the Arabic Jurisprudence theories of the Middle-Ages (or more generally their theory of Argumentation that has been largely ignored also by the analytic approaches to Argumentation theory and Epistemic Logic), or if one dares to go so far the millenary Jain epistemological lessons on the Art of the Point of View provide plenty to learn from (this constitutes another gap in the recent studies on reasoning and knowledge). On the other one cannot escape the feeling that claims as those of Foucault, though they might be seen as involving interesting questions, many of them have been brought forward without awareness (or perhaps even because of lack of awareness) of the discussions that took place in depth and length in philosophy of logic and knowledge – moreover, as a quick look on nowadays publications bring to the fore, such kind of discussions are nowadays experiencing a creative impulse at a breath-taking pace (particularly so in the context of social sciences). True, analytic philosophers and some philosophers of logic stemming from analytic philosophy quite often ignore history of philosophy or even the history of the science they are purported to study, or more generally philosophical approaches foreign to their own framework – with the result that quite often they produced a rather superficial analysis of the links between knowledge and truth – however, this only points out, that it is time that we start learning each from the other Am I falsifying Foucault? Who knows …. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Dans de récents travaux, Charles Taylor distingue deux types de libéralisme, qu'il associe respectivement au Canada et au Québec. Le premier se caractérise par l'adhésion à la règle de neutralité de I'État, tandis que le second impose moins de limites à l'intervention de l'État. Parce qu'il serait moins « homogénéisant », Taylor se prononce en faveur du second type. Plusieurs éléments de l'analyse de Taylor me semblent faux ou erronés. Premièrement, la distinction entre les deux types de libéralisme (...) n'est pas toujours claire. Deuxièmement, le type de libéralisme que Taylor favorise n'est pas du tout acceptable. Troisièmement, je ne crois pas que le Canada et le Québec adhèrent à des types différents de libéralisme. ABSTRACT In his recent works, Charles Taylor distinguishes between two forms of liberalism, which are respectively associated with Canada and Québec. The first one is characterized by its support for the neutrality of the State, while the second imposes almost no restriction to the intervention of the State. Because it is less "homogenizing", Taylor favors the second form. Many parts of Taylor's analysis seems to me to be false or erroneous. First, the distinction between the two liberalisms is not at all clear. Second, the liberalism that Taylor favors is not acceptable. Third, it is not true that Québec and Canada adhere to different forms ofliberalism. (shrink)

Rowland Stout argues that a disposition toward violence in certain circumstances counts as a virtue in Aristotle’s sense. In this paper, I will offer three reasons to reject Stout’s position. First, I will present Stout’s position. I will then argue that the plausibility of Stout’s position capitalizes on a rhetorical sleight-of-hand, what has been called the “faux anonymization of agents,” without which his position is less plausible. Next, I will argue that Stout’s own method supports conclusions which Aristotle explicitly (...) rejects—namely, that adultery, theft, and murder could also count as virtuous. Finally, I will argue that Stout fails to account for the fact that human flourishing limits the types of environments that can be used as hypothetical tools by which to discover what counts as a virtue. (shrink)

Lorsque Platon essaie, dans le Sophiste, de réfuter l’argumentation de Parménide à propos de l’inexistence du non-être, il arrive à une conclusion inattendue : c’est la langue grecque qui, du fait d’identifier « ce qui est » aux étants, rend impossible d’exprimer « ce qui n’est pas ». Or, étant donné que le discours faux, propre à la sophistique, suppose que « ce qui n’est pas » existe, Platon examine les théories des philosophes qui l’ont précédé et il découvre (...) que, mis à part le néant absolu, sur lequel il partage le jugement de Parménide, un certain non-être est possible : celui de la prédication. Fidèle à sa philosophie, Platon propose une Forme comme garantie de ce non-être relatif : l’Altérité. Celle-ci, avec sa Forme complémentaire, l’Identité, assure dorénavant la définition de chaque réalité.When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides’ argumentation about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion : i.e. the Greek language, identifying « what is » to « the beings », makes it impossible to express what is not. Now, since the false discours, proper to sophistics, supposes that « that which is not » exists, Plato examines the theories of the philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute nothingness – on which he shares Parmenides’ judgement –, some kind of a non-being is possible, i.e. that of predication. True to his philosophy, Plato suggests a Form as warrant of such a « relative » non-being : the Different. This Form, with its complementary Form, the Identity, guarantees the definition of every reality. (shrink)

La physique panpsychiste de Ruyer est fondée sur deux arguments : la science, par méthode, ne peut que méconnaître les formes, ne connaît que les structures, et toute réalité ne peut être qu'en se possédant activement, c'est-à-dire comme domaine, ou subjectivité, ou présence. La critique décisive du parallélisme psycho-physique montre que la philosophie de l'esprit, ou le fameux mind-body problem, n'est qu'un catalogue de faux problèmes . Mais, s'agissant de la personne humaine, le spiritualisme ruyérien continue la tradition empiriste (...) en faisant du « je » un point de perspective mythique et provisoire. Le « je » émerge pragmatiquement de la présence, ne la constitue pas et disparaît avec elle. Peut-on opposer à ce spiritualisme sans sujet personnel un « je » distant et séparé de la seule présence ? À distance par là même de l'activité qui, au lieu de la substance, est la catégorie fondamentale de l'ontologie ruyérienne. Ruyer's panpsychical physics is based on two arguments: science, by its method, can only underestimate the forms, can only know the structures, and any reality can exist only by controlling itself actively, that is as a domain, a subjectivity, or a presence. The crucial criticism of psycho-physical parallelism shows that the philosophy of mind, or the famous mind-body problem, is only a catalog of non-problems . However, with respect to the human person, Ruyerian spiritualism continues the empiricist tradition by turning the « I » into a mythical and temporary focal point. The « I » pragmatically emerges from the presence, it does not constitute it and it disappears with it. Can we oppose to this spiritualism deprived of any personal subject an « I » far more distant and separated from presence only? Does is exist severed from activity, which, replacing substance, is the fundamental category of Ruyerian ontology? (shrink)

Histoire de la philosophie et liberté -- Le monde libre -- Le récit du commencement : une aporie de la raison grecque -- La vraisemblance du faux (Parménide, fragment I, 31-32) -- Sur le plan du Timée -- La cosmologie finale du Sophiste (265b4-e6) -- La communauté humaine dans la philosophie grecque -- Note sur la définition du mouvement (Physique III 1-3) -- Le fou stoïcien.

Cet article présente une analyse du thème de la religion dans l’oeuvre de Bruno Latour. Certains commentateurs affirment que la présence persistante du thème n’est qu’une manifestation de la piété catholique résiduelle de Latour et, ce faisant, mettent en cause l’ontologie pluraliste qu’il défend. M’inscrivant en faux face à ces critiques, je suggère que ce thème a constitué un argument dominant dès les premières étapes de sa carrière. Latour propose deux définitions de la religion. La première, que j’ai nommée (...) « la Religion », a vocation à fermer le monde pluriel. La seconde, que Latour nomme « religion comme mode d’existence », ou [REL], est une expression de ce monde pluriel et, pour cette raison, peut être qualifiée de « rationnelle ». Si on perd de vue cet aspect, on risque de se priver du potentiel de critique de la situation de la modernité séculière que nous offre sa pensée.This paper examines the theme of religion in the work of Bruno Latour. Some critics have suggested that the persistent presence of this theme is an indication of a residual Catholic piety on the part of Latour and hence that it calls into question the pluralist ontology he advocates. However, I will argue that this theme has been a concern from the earliest stages of his career. In fact, Latour identifies two forms of religion as operating in the world. The first, which I will name “Religion,” serves to close down the plurality of the world. The second, which Latour himself names “religion as a mode of existence,” or [REL], is an expression of the plural world, and can be called rational for this reason. If this point is not well understood, the potential of Latour’s work for a critique of the situation of secular modernity risks being missed. (shrink)

Qu'on le veuille ou non, depuis qu'il est sorti de la clandestinite, le cinema porno est devenu l'un des grands genres cinematographiques du divertissement populaire, a cote du thriller, du film d'horreur, de la comedie sentimentale etc. Il est tout a fait insuffisant de definir un genre par les reactions qu'il est cense susciter chez les spectateurs (en l'occurrence l'excitation sexuelle). De meme, il est insuffisant de le definir par son iconographie i.e. les differentes performances sexuelles et la maniere dont (...) elles sont filmees. Il est tout simplement faux d'affirmer que les films pornographiques se ressemblent tous et ne racontent rien. Qu'est-ce que nous racontent donc les films pornos? (shrink)

--Filosofīi︠a︡, kak dukhovnoe di︠e︡lanīe.--Filisofīi︠a︡ i zhiznʹ.--O vozrozhdenīi filisofskago opyta.

The four essays collected in this dossier are directed upon the contemporary understandings of blackness, as an ontology, a phenomenology, or a historicity. In the order of their presentation they encompass and situate what seems first to limit black being or overflow it, but which, when questioned, that is, disclosed, or unconcealed, does not fit into this logos, nor is ordered by it, even making what is most discernable about blackness in its past, future, or present, seem imaginary, moored in (...) a non-present,and presence, but in ways which make the non-being that marks blackness as sign, affect, or speaking being, unthinkable except as an appearing, a manifestation, an identity.As a dossier directed upon the present philosophical understanding of blackness, each paper seeks to unanchor blackness from the meanings and presuppositions that it normally calls forth. Beyond what is discernable, or ready-made, each paper addresses structures that make (and have made) blackness discernable as the always given to be seen, as meaningless speech, as pathology, as a concept beyond reason.The dossier opens with a question: what kind of disturbance does blackness present to being? Why does it seem to madden reason, or call forth frenzy? In Calvin Warren’s essay, “The Karen Call,” what comes into correlation with blackness are various kinds of emergency that structure white thought and presence but that belie witnessing and intelligibility, and in whose chain of significations can be discerned an ontological privilege that constitutes the world. To appear emergent, it seems, all blackness has to do is become one with the myth that bans or compromises it; a manifestation in which subject-object relations are already polarized by the dangers that deploy it in dramas of emergency. Once blackness becomes emergent, there is no escape, for it comes up against what Warren, reading Heidegger against the grain, suggests is a racial destiny of Being. To appear black is forthwith to resemble an es gibt that is indissociable from threat, falsehood, fantasy, and obliteration. To that extent, blackness attests to a kind of ontological emergency without surcease or hope, and one whose trace remains in every moment or glimpse; whose technical modality and structure always returns us to the call that is neither speech nor gaze, word nor symbol, but represents an extimacy that is undeconstructable, beyond utterance, meaning, or reparation.Such extimacy seems to induce a crisis in the philosophical notion of being itself. In Axelle Karera’s essay, “Paraontology,” the question asked is why blackness cannot be contained or fitted into ontology itself; or, if philosophy is ontology, why does blackness seem to signify an irreducible resistance to it?How does such resistance occur? If blackness can only be presented as “paraontology,” a word that seems to shelter ontology at the same time as it presents the search for a new order of being, what does the para teach us about blackness as disorder, resistance, or identity? What is its philosophical genealogy and affiliation, and why does the para itself seem to never get beyond its own conciliation, or filiation to philosophy, whose ordering and racist historicity thereby remains the seme and mark of the para as interval, trope, and index? Or, put more simply, can blackness ever resist its own resistance as trope, conjuncture, or representation? Retracing that genealogy through the work of Oskar Becker, Karera uncovers a surreptitious repetition in black uses of the word, in whose weave can be discerned a fascist interference that not only undermines the fugitivity of the resistance so claimed, but one that unwittingly repeats a fascist ontology of world, history, and being.1 It’s a startling, deeply disturbing claim. But the apparent echoing of the Heideggerian bell in black significations of ontology suggests that what is being reabsorbed here is not so much a radical difference but a concept that remains justified and in fee to, pardoned and annulled by, a white notion of being. What, then, can it mean to think blackness as para? Nothing more than a philosophical confusion that confuses l’être qui fuit, that is, the lack that Lacan says cannot be completed or resisted, for an appositional fantasy of displacement. Here everything that is deemed black has to be made meaningful in apposition to ontology, but everything that is black must also, it seems, always return apposition to the white para of ontology; to be black and appositional would, it seems, produce only the disavowal of the philosophical genealogy that always already determines it.One would be right to distrust such claims—the moralism of the refusal, and the scandal of the faux resistance by which the para hides behind its own whited-out screen.In the third contribution to the dossier, the question asked is what would it mean for blackness to repair itself, to let go or retrieve and so redeem its own historical conjuncture? How do we refer to an irreparable past, that is, a past that keeps on coming back, but one that has no sign or signified, no memory that can recapture or reveal it, or simply rejoin us to it without remainder? Rinaldo Walcott’s essay, “‘Retrospective Significance,’” revisits the reparations debate as a question of black being. Instead of repair, he finds desolation and emptiness, or what he calls a staggeringly incoherent rhetoric of coherency. It’s a paradox that addresses what it means to remember or to forget a nothing; if blackness is nothing, how does one reconnect with it, bond with it, compensate it in its historic devastation? What would it mean to receive meaning from such devastation, to express it if this nothingness is absolute, or absolutely valueless? If ontology is a structure, then blackness, Walcott suggests, expresses nothing less than a “slave-ness” that continues to confront and disturb us absolutely, irrevocably. As such slave-ness is the trace that remains as a sign of the irreparable. As a trace, and not a sign, slave-ness becomes the primordial signifier of being, nation, history, and diaspora. But it is what makes it irrecuperable that defines its value and difficulty for the very language of reparation. Walcott pursues this difficult, enigmatic thread through the work of black thinkers on diaspora and identity. He concludes: black being cannot be dissociated from the disturbance it offers value, conscience, and any thought of alterity.The final and fourth contribution returns to the question of blackness as the trace or thread (the monstration) of being. How does one follow the thread (montrer) of blackness if it is always already withdrawn from being? David Marriott’s essay, “Ontology and Lalangue,” evokes Lacan’s concept of lalangue in pursuit of this enigmatic equivocation between letter and signifier, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Showing how both discourses have sought to master this exorbitance as master and/or free it as slave, I show how blackness is extinguished by the very words used to precipitate it into being. The slavish audacity of this lalangue is then shown to disarticulate, or more exactly, withdraw from ontology, but only so that whiteness can be presented and proclaimed all the more as the un-representable truth and logic of Dasein. This way of excluding blackness while preserving whiteness is not only central to philosophical and psychoanalytic understandings of language, Marriott argues, but this way of manifesting itself without manifesting itself is also crucial to the racialization of the logos as such.What is essential here is the way a meaning that is beyond meaning or representation is inserted into a problematic of mastery and servitude that advances-conceals a racial genealogy but in ways that makes the being of blackness an enigma. As such, blackness becomes an exorbitance that is always effaced in its monstration. More, its revelation must necessarily be unrecognized as the very locus of knowledge and truth. In that sense, what would it mean to figure, or to speak, this n’est pas without the consolation of being, meaning, truth, or logic? What would it mean to represent it as situated or defined by the language of ontology? Is black speaking being always in a relationship to and simultaneously the manifestation of a lalangue of lalangue? (shrink)

Lucian of Samosata is often painted as a satirist and rhetorician, but also as an anti- philosopher. In my contribution I show that he is, instead, involved in a sophisticated metaphilosophical project which follows a Socratic spirit. Yet, there are (almost) no positive characterisations of philosophy to be found in his works: schools, doctrines, and individuals all become the object of biting criticisms or ridicule. Given this situation, we ought to seek the Socratic aspects of Lucian’s project in his critical (...) performance as well as in the criteria his attacks are based on, namely consistency, evidence, and fidelity to the given argument. His metaphilosophy unfolds around three distinctions. The first distinction being that between philosophy and philosophers. In the first part of the paper, I elaborate how Lucian attacks faux philosophers for failing to practice what they preach, that is, for their lack of performative consistency. I also discuss possible positive portrayals of philosophers in his works. The second distinction, which occupies us in the second part, is that between philosophy and philosophies, the multiple schools and traditions. From this multiplicity he constructs a starting problem for philosophy: how do we know which of the philosophies to choose in the first place without already presupposing a philosophical position? A third difference can be adduced, namely that between doctrinal and non-doctrincal philosophy. In Lucian’s perspective, which I summarize in the concluding part of the paper, philosophy is a way of reflexive critical thinking, rather than the dogmatic adherence to the doctrines of a given school. (shrink)

Heather M. Farley and Zachary A. Smith, Sustainability: If It’s Everything, Is It Nothing? xiv + 176 pp., index. New York: Routledge, 2014. $39.95 Leslie Paul Thiele, Sustainability. viii + 234 p., bibl., index. New York: Polity Press, 2013. $22.95 The authors of both of these books offer new definitions of sustainability. They do so in order to battle “faux interpretations” or “hypocritical” or “unsupported endorsements” of sustainability. While I think many people, including I expect many readers of this (...) journal, would agree that sustainability is a rather imprecise concept that sometimes gets misused, I am not convinced the definitions in these books offer a way forward. Partly this is due to the specific ways the authors develop their discussions, and partly it is due to issues connected to their shared methodological approach, viz. the search for a new, univocal, strong definition. After discussing each book, I examine briefly that shared .. (shrink)

Commentary on Nūr al-Tahz̲īb, textbook taught in Maddrassa (religious schools) in Pakistan by religious scholar from Peshawar, Pakistan.

This paper is a response to Kathleen Stock’s book Material Girls, by way of imitation. I have attempted to write a faux chapter in the book’s style, identifying four moments in overcoming the low-high culture divide in responses to the arts.

v. 1. Sŏngnihak pʻyŏn -- v. 2. Kyŏngse sasang pʻyŏn.

The work on set theory made by A. Tarski in the years 1924-1950 is very interesting, but little know.We develope partial questions in set theory in the moment that A. Tarski intervenes and his contributionsand also influences.The principals aims in this development are:1. The axiom of choice [A.C.] and his equivalents;2. the general continuum hypothesis [G.C.H.] and the A.C.;3. the dual trichotomy principle;4. the inaccessible cardinals and his relation with the A.C. and the G.C.H.;5. the notion of finite set and (...) his relation with the A.C and the G.C.H.;6. the almost disjoint set and their relation with the G.C.H.;and finally,7. the results in Berkeley. (shrink)